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I. INTRODUCTION

Haiti's turbulent history has been filled with serious challenges
relating to such issues as national development, politics, and the
economy, as well as recurring natural disasters. The January 2010
earthquake in Haiti killed over 200,000 people,' making it one of the
world's most devastating natural disasters in recent history. The InterAmerican Development Bank has estimated the cost of rebuilding Haiti
to be as much as $14 Billion (U.S.), "more than double the country's
annual GDP."2
The international community was quick to respond in the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake. 3 However, it remains to be seen whether
potentially positive change can emerge from this tragic and catastrophic
event, bringing Haiti closer to becoming a more secure, economically
* Ph.D. (candidate) (NUI Galway), M.St. (International Law) (Oxford), B.A. (Hons.)
(University of Toronto), Certificat Pratique de Langue Frangaise (La Sorbonne). The views expressed
in this Article are those of the writer.
1. Daniel P. Erikson, Obama and the HaitianEarthquake,FOCALPolaT, Mar. 2010, at 1,
availableat http://www.focal.ca/publications/focalpoint/214-march-2010-daniel-p-erikson.
2. Id.

3. See, e.g., id. at 1 ("[t]he enormity of the challenge has mobilized the Obama
administration to mount an unprecedented effort to help provide relief and assistance in the
recovery of its badly damaged neighbour").
49
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viable, and stable state. Consistent with Haiti's troubled history, recent
events have done little to assure either Haitians or the international
community that viability and stability are reasonable expectations in the
near term for this troubled country.
In Haiti, state failure both creates and perpetuates overwhelming
human need. Even before the earthquake and the immediate
humanitarian assistance that was needed to deal with the recovery, the
country demonstrated several types of competency gaps in terms of
providing its citizens with their most basic needs, including food,
health, education, and security.4
State failure, the flow of economic and political refugees, poverty,
disease, and violence can strain foreign aid budgets and philanthropic
resources. Thus far, the international response in Haiti has not been
well-coordinated or consistent. If history is any indication, the resqonse
to this crisis will be inadequate to meet the challenges facing Haiti.
Various historical, economic, ethnic, nationalistic, and political
situations can lead to different degrees of state failure. In addressing
these challenges, the international community must develop appropriate
mechanisms and concepts if there is to be success. Weak states
eventually become failed states and pose not only security and
development challenges for the international community, but also legal
challenges. 6 In an international system premised upon state sovereignty
and state consent, dysfunctional governments create a range of
problems when they are unable to effectively grant that consent.
When states fail, they suffer from five primary competency gaps:
legitimacy, order, security, maintenance of the rule of law, and an
inability to deliver minimum public services. These competency gaps
almost always result in the international community assuming
responsibility for repairing failed states. Effective policies and resources
are required to overcome the competency gaps and break the cycles of
violence, economic collapse, and state failure. Tailoring assistance to
the specific competency gaps in specific failing states requires active
4. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing the 2008 riots caused by "a 40 percent rise in the costs of
basic food commodities, which cut deeply into the standard of living of a majority of the
population subsisting on less than two dollars per day."); see Marlye G61in-Adams & David M.
Malone, Haiti: A Case of Endemic Weakness, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A
TIME OF TERROR 287 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003) [hereinafter STATE FAILURE AND STATE
WEAKNESS].

5. See Alex Dupuy, Beyond the Earthquake: A Wake-Up call for Haiti, WESLEYAN
ARGUS, Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://wesleyanargus.com/2010/01/26/beyond-theearthquake-a-wake-up-call-for-haitil (stating, "local actors did not create these conditions alone
but did so in close partnership with foreign governments and economic actors with longstanding interests in Haiti").
6. WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 3 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2004)
[hereinafter WHEN STATES FAIL].
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and unprecedented international cooperation to help deal with the
security, development, and political institutions.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Haiti's long history of political instability and corruption magnified
the negative impact of the earthquake. Haiti has been victimized by
large, global powers since the moment it won independence. This, along
with calamities such as the recent earthquake, has led Haiti to become
the poorest country in the Americas. 7
"The colonial conquest [of Haiti], which began in 1492 with the
arrival of Christopher Columbus . . . led to the eradication of the

original inhabitants," who were quickly replaced by African slaves.8
"Aided by a decline in Spanish power, France acquired the western
third of the island and named it Saint Domingue" in 1697.9 "The
increasing number of French settlers was accompanied by a massive
importation of slaves to toil on plantations of coffee, sugar cane, cotton,
and indigo." 10 "Disagreements between absent plantation owners ...
and emerging local elites," as well as the fallout from the French
Revolution, "fueled a thirteen-year multiracial independence movement
in Saint Domingue that gave birth to the Republic of Haiti on January 1,
180 4 ."11 This movement was the first successful slave-based revolt

against a colonial power.1 2 Haiti became the second republic in the
Western Hemisphere, and the first to be ruled by blacks.' 3 "[Tihe
Haitian Revolution left an indelible mark on the liberation movement of
many continents."1 4
Haiti was punished for its rebellion with blockades and quarantines

7. Haiti Country Profile, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country
profiles/1202772.stm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
8. STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra 4, at 289; see also PATRICK
BELLEGARDE-SMriH, HAITI: THE BREACHED CITADEL 31-32 (1990).
9. STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 289; BELLEGARDE-SMITH,
supra note 8, at 33. See Eric Margolis, Haiti Must Be Rescued From Itself HUFFINGTON POST,

Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-margolis/haiti-must-be0rescuedfro b 428409.html.
10. STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 289.
11. Id; see also LAENNEC HURBON, COMPRENDRE HAITI: ESSAI SUR L'ETAT, LA NATION,
LA CULTURE 76 (1987).
12. STEEVE COUPEAU, THE HISTORY OF HAITI 4 (2008); STATE FAILURE AND STATE
WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 287.
13. Ben Macintyre, The FaultLine in Haiti Runs Straight to France, TIMES ONLINE, Jan.
21 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/ben macintyre/article6995750.
ece (last visited Jan. 29, 2011); see also COUPEAu, supra note 12, at 34.
14. COUPEAU, supra note 12, at 34.
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from such nations as France and the United States.' 5 It was not until
Abraham Lincoln became President in 1860 that the United States
finally extended diplomatic recognition to Haiti.16 France imposed a
massive financial penalty in the form of indemnity that Haiti did not
finish paying back until 1947.17 Thus, Haiti remained endemically weak
even after achieving independence.
The former colonial structures of control were never destroyed
following Haiti's independence but, rather, were simply maintained
under a new domestic force, while rival leaders of the liberation began
to fight amongst themselves.' 9 The country's new rulers actually
became more powerful after determining that some labor and economic
discipline had to be restored in order to preserve the plantation
economy. The Haitians feared that if they failed to generate sufficient
income to pay the required indemnity, the former colonial powers
would use this as an excuse to retake the island.
Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who had been a revolutionary leader
wasted little time in declaring himself Haiti's Emperor in 1804.26
Corruption was rife during Dessalines's regime, which virtually emptied
the national treasury. 2 1 As a result, the state was unable to pay the
salaries of the members of its armed forces. 2 2 In 1806, with his military
support collapsing, the emperor was assassinated by army officers.2 3
were characterized by violence, corruption,
The following decades
24
and racial tensions. What emerged was a ruling elite that effectively
controlled the national economy for self-interested purposes. 25 These
15. Id. at 37.
16. Id; STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 290; MICHEL-ROLPH
TROUILLOT, HAITI: STATE AGAINST NATIONS, THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF DUVALIERISM 53

(2000).
17. Macintyre, supranote 13.
18. Id.
19. See STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 289-90; see also Margolis,
supranote 9.
20. REVOLUTIONARY FREEDOMS: A HISTORY OF SURVIVAL, STRENGTH AND IMAGINATION

INHAITI 55 (Cdcile Accilion et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARY FREEDOMS].
21. Haiti: Historical Setting, in DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAM: COUNTRY STUDIES

(Helen C. Metz ed., 2001), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@
field(DOCID+htOO 19) [hereinafter Haiti: HistoricalSetting].
22. Id.
23. Id.; see REVOLUTIONARY FREEDOMS, supra note 20, at 55.
24. See STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 291. For further

discussion, see generally Charles R. Venator Santiago, Race, Nation-Building and Legal
Transculturalism During the Haitian Unification Period (1822-1844): Towards a Haitian
Perspective, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 667 (2004).
25. See Margolis, supra note 9 (stating, "[flor the next century, Haiti was ruled by a
feuding mulatto minority and petty dictators who did nothing for the people."); see also STATE
FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 291.
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elites "reproduced the . . . colonial system by taxing all of the . . . crops

that the population produced for its own consumption." 26 During this
period, the military adopted an interventionist role, characterized by
repression and corruption that continued for most of Haiti's modem
history.27
The role of the United States in Haiti grew steadily, culminating with
overt intervention in Haitian affairs between 1911 and 1915. 28 During
this period, the United States perceived great instability in Haiti. Seven
Haitian presidents were either assassinated or overthrown during these
four years. 29 Furthermore, in 1915, Haitian President and General
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam had to contend with a revolt led by Rosalvo
Bobo.30 The United States perceived Bobo as a serious threat by virtue
of his strong anti-American beliefs. 1 Additionally, the United States
was also concerned with growing German interests and presence in
Haiti.3 2
In July 1915, General Sam was murdered and dismembered by an
angry mob.3 3 The United States used this occurrence to justify a military
invasion and the occupation of the troubled island that lasted until
1934.34 The Haitian-American Treaty of 191535 established a U.S.controlled police force, or gendarmerie, made up of both Americans and
Haitians. 36 The Treaty gave the United States control over Haiti's
finances and provided for direct American intervention on the island
whenever the United States saw fit to exercise this power.37
Despite American efforts to build roads, bridges, and schools, and to
reform the healthcare system during its occupation, life for the average
Haitian did not appreciably improve. 38 Haiti's political structure during
26. STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 291.
27. See id.
28.

COUPEAU, supra note 12, at 75; see also STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra

note 4, at 292.
29.

STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 292.

30. COUPEAU, supra note 12, at 71.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 57.
33. Navy Dep't Libr., U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, http://www.history.navy.mill
library/online/haitimain.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
34. COUPEAU, supra note 12, at 71, 75 (stating, "[t]he bilateral convention remained in

effect until 1935").
35. HANS SCHMIDT, THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF HAITI, 1915-1934, at 115 (2d ed.
1995).
36. U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/Haiti (last visited Jan. 18, 2010) [hereinafter U.S.
Dep't of State].
37. Id.
38. STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 293; see also Haiti: Historical
Setting, supra note 21.
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the U.S. occupation featured a succession of de facto regimes that were
essentially instruments of the United States. 39 Election results were
clearly manipulated. 40 The constitution was written by future U.S.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who, at the time, was Secretary of
the Navy. 4 1 Despite these efforts, or perhaps because of them,
insurrections continued and international criticism of the U.S.
occupation resulted.4 2 In the face of mounting pressure, the United
States withdrew from Haiti in 1934.43
The entire period of the U.S. occupation of Haiti was demoralizing
to Haitians, after having been the first country to achieve independence
from a colonial power in the previous century. After the U.S.
withdrawal from Haiti, there was a feeble attempt by elite Haitians to
form a Communist party system, but the population opposed any
outside labels, whether they were rightist or leftist in nature.
The succeeding years saw the formation and collapse of no less than
eight governments in Haiti.4 5 Some were civilian and some were
military in nature, but all were doomed to failure. Their demise was
largely the result of greed, corruption, oppression, and profound selfinterest. In 1957, President Frangois Duvalier rose to power.46 Duvalier
(a.k.a. Papa Doc) used manipulation and oppression, much more
effectively than his predecessors, so that he quickly consolidated
power.47
After surviving an attempted coup, Papa Doc removed the entire
military leadership and replaced them with officers loyal to him. 48 He
also created his own private militia, the Tonton Macoutes (known
simply as the Macoutes). 49 His opponents either fled or were
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 293.

44.

MATTHEW J. SMITH, RED & BLACK IN HAITI: RADICALISM, CONFLICT, AND POLITICAL

U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 36.
Haiti: HistoricalSetting, supra note 21.
See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 36.
See id.

CHANGE, 1934-1957, at 14-23 (2008).

45. The U.S. occupation of Haiti was from 1915-1934 and during that time the list of
Presidents are as followed: 1. Sternio Vincent (1930-1941); 2. Elie Lescot (1941-1946
overthrown); 3. Franck Lavaud (1946 Military Council); 4. Dumarsais Estime (1946-1950
overthorown); 5. Paul Eug&ne Magloire (1950-1956 overthrown); 6. Joseph Nemours PierreLouis (1956-1957); 7. Franck Sylvain (1957); 8. Executive Government Council (1957); 9.
Antonio Thrasybule Kebreau (Chairman of the Military Council 1957); Francois Duvalier
(1957-1971).
46. COUPEAU, supra note 12, at x; see also STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra
note 4, at 294.
47. See STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 294.

48. Haiti: HistoricalSetting, supra note 21.
49.

STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 294; see also COUPEAU, supra

note 12, at 88.
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murdered.50 The Macoutes operated with volunteers who were
essentially criminals practicing intimidation and extortion as a means of
survival and profit. 5 ' Throughout rural Haiti, the Macoutes maintained
control, while in the capital, the Presidential Guard was increased to
protect Papa Doc's authority. 52 Corruption was rampant. 53
In 1961, Papa Doc won the general election as the only candidate on
the ballot. 54 In 1964, he declared himself Haiti's president for life. 55 He
amended the constitution to eliminate one of the legislative houses,
thereby Froviding greater control in the unicameral body that
survived. Duvalier created a cult of personality and fueled rumours
that he was a voodoo priest who had become the corporeal embodiment
of Haiti itself.5 7
Prior to his death in 1971, Papa Doc ensured familial succession by
naming his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (a.k.a. Baby Doc) the next
Haitian president for life.58 Baby Doc was only 19 years old at the time
and had little interest in running the country; he essentially deferred
power to his mother.5 9 Baby Doc's tenure was marked by unfulfilled
commitments for reform, both domestically and internationally. He did
permit more freedom of the press and the existence of human rights
groups, but substantive democratic reform did not occur, and corruption
ran rampant through the regime. 6 0 Eventually, a dictatorial crackdown
commenced, radio stations were closed, and opposition leaders arrested
(and in some cases, killed).6 1
As a result of these developments, U.S. President Ronald Reagan
threatened to withdraw American aid to Haiti.62 Under pressure from
the Reagan administration, Baby Doc appointed his chief of staff,
General Namphy, the new head of the provisional National Council of
Government (CNG).63 He then escaped to France with his family and
what was believed to be a pilfered fortune of approximately $400
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 294.

See Haiti: HistoricalSetting, supra note 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; see also COUPEAU, supra note 12, at x.
Haiti: HistoricalSetting, supra note 21.
See id.
See id.

59. Haiti: HistoricalSetting, supra note 21; see also DAVID NICHOLLS, FROM DESSALINES
To DUVALIER: RACE, COLOUR AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN HAITI (London: Macmillan

Caribbean 1996) (1979).
60. Haiti:HistoricalSetting, supra note 21.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id
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million. 64 Remarkably, Baby Doc re-emerged in January 2011,
unexpectedly and mysteriously returning to Haiti from France."s While
it appears he had intended to remain in Haiti for only a brief period, he
is now the subject of a criminal investigation that has prevented his
return to France.66 The impact of his return on Haiti remains to be seen,
although it is more likely than not that his presence will only create
greater instability. 67
The CNG did little to curb the actions of the Macoutes, and did even
less to bring those responsible for past indiscretions to justice. 6 8 This led
to instances of violence against present and former members of the
Macoutes. The CNG's half-hearted handling of the Macoutes, who
had killed and tortured many innocent victims, fueled discontent among
the masses. 70
In 1987, a new constitution established Haiti as a presidential
republic, whereby the president was the head of state, elected by
popular vote, and the prime minister was chosen from the ruling party in
the elected National Assembly. 7 1 This constitution reduced the powers
of the army and police, by separating them, and recognized Creole, in
addition to French, as an official language of Haiti. The constitution
also removed the 1935 prohibition on voodoo, recognizing it as a
religion.73 Power was decentralized from the capital city, instead being
wielded by provincial councils. 74 AdditionallN, military personnel now
had to resign one year before entering politics.
In 1990, Haiti's general election was monitored by the United
Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). 6 JeanBertrand Aristide a former Jesuit priest, was elected president with
67% of the vote. 7'
It was unknown how Aristide would govern when he came to power.
Many hoped that Aristide's moderate persona, expressed during the

64. John Moody, HaitiEnd ofthe DuvalierEra,TIME, June 24, 2001.
65. Randal C. Archibold, A Former Dictator Reappears in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2011, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/world/americas/I7haiti.html.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Moody, supra note 64.
69. Id.
70. Haiti: HistoricalSetting, supra note 21.
71. CONSTuTIoN OF HAIn (1987) arts. 133, 134, & 137.
72. Id. arts. 5, 263.
73. See id. art. 35.
74. Id. ch. 1.
75. Id. art. 132.
76. STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 296.

77. Id.
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campaign, would prevail. However, those who financialqI controlled
Haiti were very concerned about a change in the status quo.
Aristide's unyielding criticisms of the Duvalier regime made him
popular with Haiti's poor.8 0 He survived repeated assassination
attempts, and his popularity actually grew among other sectors of
society.81 However, Artistide's criticism of certain elements of
democracy and capitalism was troubling to many observers.
It was only a matter of months before Aristide lost the confidence of
the Chamber of Deputies and the Haitian Senate. In order to hold
power, he encouraged mob violence to intimidate his opponents. 82
However, he did not have control of the military, and General Raoul
Cedras launched a coup.8 3 In the aftermath of the coup, the OAS
instituted a full hemisphere-wide economic embargo on Haiti and
demanded Aristide's return to power. 84 Aristide fled Haiti for the United
States, where he established a government in exile in Washington.8 5
It was during this time, with Aristide trying to negotiate his return,
that thousands of Haitians boarded boats and tried to enter the United
States. 86 However, the Clinton and (George H.W.) Bush administrations
denied them asylum, and they were forcibly returned to Haiti. The
United States also imposed a crushing trade embargo in order to
facilitate the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. This embargo

78. See id
79. See id.
80. Michael F. Gallo, Hope in Haiti? An Interview with Jean Bertrand Aristide, available
at http://www.touchstonmemag.com/archives/article.php?id=03-03-026-i#ixzzlGEYNcGyA.
Aristide first came to international attention in 1985 when during a Mass he
preached a landmark sermon severely criticizing the regime of Presidentfor-life Jean-Claude ("Baby-Doc") Duvalier. This was one of the sparks
which set off the popular uprising ousting the tyrant Duvalier in February,
1986. Participating in marches and working with peasants throughout the
country, he became perhaps the most popular priest in Haiti and leader of
the "Little Church" movement (congregations inspired by liberation
theology).
Id.
81. Id. at 296.
82. Maureen Taft-Morales, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current
Congressional Concerns, CRS Report for Congress, May 4, 2006, at 7.
83. Id. at 297.
84. See id. at 297 n.30.
85. See id. at 297.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Jeffrey D. Sachs, After The Earthquake, How To Rebuild HaitiFrom Scratch, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 17, 2010.
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destroyed Haiti's fragile manufacturing industries. 89
General Cedras's regime defied the OAS embargo, while the Bush
administration unilaterally exempted the United States from the OAS
policy, and rampant smuggling occurred from the Dominican Republic
to Haiti. 90 Aristide asked that the U.N. support the embargo and that a
civilian mission be established for Haiti. 9 1
By July 1993, the United Nations and the OAS had worked out an
agreement for the return of Aristide. 92 The so-called Governors Island
Accord provided that General Cedras would retire, Aristide would
become president again, and the embargo would be lifted. 9 3 The
Agreement, signed by all parties, ran into trouble when General Cedras
refused to retire. 94 Sanctions were thus reinstated by the United

Nations. 9 5
In 1994, the regime attempted to bypass the accord by appointing
Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint to be a provisional president.
As a result, more severe sanctions were imposed by the United
Nations.9 7 With thousands of U.S. troops landing in Haiti, Aristide was
returned to power and General Cedras was allowed to leave the
country.98 Aristide's return was followed by a period of economic
growth in the country. 99 However, with increasing migration to the
cities, an underdeveloped infrastructure led to problems with security.100
89. Id.
90. James Morrell, The Governors Island Accord on Haiti, available at http://www.
haitipolicy.org/archives/Publications&Commentary/governors.htm.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. GlobalSecurity.org, Operation Uphold Democracy, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/upholddemocracy.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Operation Uphold
Democracy].
97. S.C. REs. 917, U.N. Doc. S/REs/917 (May 6, 1994). By July 31, 1994, the United
Nations had adopted Resolution 940 authorizing:
Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and
control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the
departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the
Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected
President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government
of Haiti.
S.C. REs. 940, U.N. Doc. S/REs/940 (July 31, 1994)
98. Operation UpholdDemocracy, supra note 96.
99. Peace Operations Monitor, The Impossible Join Nat'l Project: 1804-2004, availableat
http://pom.peacebuild.ca/haitiConflicts.shtml [hereinafter Peace Operations Monitor].
100. Id.; see also STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 298 (stating
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In 1996, Ren6 Pr6val, Aristide's former prime minister, was elected
president.1or Pr6val completed his five-year term uninterrupted.102 This
was the first time this occurred in Haitian history. However, Parliament
was dissolved in 1999, and he ruled by decree for the remaining twelve
months of his presidency. 0 3
With Prival as president, unemployment hit an all-time low, public
entities were privatized, and a national police force replaced the
army.104 Unfortunately, conflict between pro-Aristide and anti-Aristide
factions precluded any real success for the Haitian economy, and the
country's infrastructure began to collapse.' 0 5 Trafficking in cocaine
became an enormous industry in Haiti, and the country became one of
the main transit points for illicit narcotics in the Americas. 106
In 2000, Aristide was returned to power with 92% of the vote in an
election that was boycotted by all major opposition parties. 0 7 A
multinational peacekeeping force struggled to hold nominal control. 0 8
A dramatic increase in the number of homicides and kidnappings led to
a complete meltdown in the political system.' 09
Between 2000 and 2004, the political situation deteriorated even
further. 1 0o The president contributed to the problems with rhetorical
speeches and by using the militia to intimidate and murder opponents."
Armed offensives started to occur throughout the country and Haiti
descended into chaos. 1 12 Aristide was forced to leave the country in
2004, and the newly formed United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) was charged with restoring stability to the
country." 3

"security sector reform remained limited in Haiti").
101. Embassy of Haiti, Biography of His Excellency Rend Prival, President of Haiti,
(last
http://www.haiti.org/index.php?option=com-content&view-article&id=50&Itemid= 117
visited Jan. 28, 2011).
102. See id.
103. Taft-Morales, supra note 82, at 9.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. See WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 6, at 19.
107. Peace Operations Monitor, supra note 99.
108. Freedomhouse overview and at 2, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/WoW/2006/
Haiti2006.pdf.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Robert Fatton Jr., The Fall of Aristide and Haiti's Current Predicament, in HAITI:
HOPE FOR A FRAGILE STATE 20 (Yasmine Shamsie & Andrew S. Thompson eds., 2006).
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS,
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SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW

Civil, political, economic, and social rights in Haiti are all tenuous.
Haiti has yet to ratify the International Convention on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights. According to U.N. independent expert
Michel Forst, ratification of the convention would send a clear message
to Haitians that their government is determined to fight social and
economic inequalities, as well as to seek international and bilateral
technical assistance and cooperation to provide universal access to
"education

. . . a [viable] health-care system, drinking water and

sanitation services, adequate and decent housing, [as well as
guaranteed] employment income and training."ll 4 The Forst report also
outlined six human rights concerns, including: the country's
penitentiary situation and prison overcrowding; violence against
women; lynching; human trafficking; deportation; and the lack of
economic, social, and cultural rights.1
Haiti has started to demonstrate a commitment to curbing violence
against women by ratifying important regional and international treaties
and establishing domestic laws in this regard.1 16 Although rape and
indecent assault can be dealt with under provisions of the Criminal
Code, there is a concern that sexual harassment is tolerated by society
and the State. 117 Many victims are dissuaded from reporting such
incidents by the perpetrator or the perpetrator's family, or even from
their own families, for fear of reprisals." 8 Following the January 2010
earthquake there were numerous reports of rape reported to Amnesty
International and as of January 2011 the organization continues to
document widespread rapes in Haiti and in particular within the tent
cities housing displaced persons. 119 In addition, many instances of
vigilante justice have been reported, often in the form of killing those
who commit theft, murder, kidnapping, witchcraft, and other criminal
acts.120 These incidents stem from a profound lack of confidence in the
121
police and justice system.
114. U.N. Hum. Rights Council [HRC], Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building,
Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, 85, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/1 1/5 (Mar. 26, 2009) (preparedby Michel Forst) [hereinafter Forst].
15-20.
115. Id
116. Id. 1 67 (Haiti ratified the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment
and Eradication of Violence Against Women).
117. Id. 68.
118. Id. 69.
119. Amnesty Int'l, Haiti: Sexual Violence Against Women Increasing, Jan. 6, 2011,
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/haiti-sexual-violence-againstwomen-increasing-2011-01-06.
120. Forst, supra note 114,$ 73.
121. Id.
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Human trafficking is another significant problem, especially in
border regions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.' 2 Children
are especially at risk.123 Many births in the region go unregistered,
exacerbating issues such as kidnapping, adoption, and forced child
labor, particularly under the "restavek" or "stay with," 24 system-a
form of domestic servitude which the United Nations considers a
"modem form of slavery."l 25
Canada and the United States were criticized in the U.N. report for
deporting individuals who have committed criminal acts in their host
country.6 Given the likelihood that a deportee will reoffend once in
Haiti, deportees increase Haiti's crime rate and further burden Haiti's
ineffectual justice system.127 However, there are no statistics available
to show the extent to which deportees reoffend once in Haiti. Still, the
Haitian government has perpetuated the notion that all deportees are
dangerous criminals, causing them to be immediately stigmatized upon
their arrival in Haiti.12 8
Establishing the rule of law in Haiti is a necessary precursor to
improving human security. This will make it possible to contemplate the
country's sustainable development, and reform the police force and the
judiciary. However, it is essential that reforms in these two areas are
implemented equitably, with neither one taking precedence over the
other. 129
Judicial and penitentiary reforms are required. At present, both
lawyers and judges are abusing the use of pretrial detention, the average
length of which is about two years for felonies.1 30 Prisoners held in
122. Id. 74.
123. Id. 74-76.
124. Id. 76.
125. Press Release, U.N. Hum. Rights Off. of the High Comm'r, UN Expert on Slavery
Expresses Concern Over 'Restavek' System in Haiti, (June 10, 2009), available at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear-en)/BB364919CAC954A3Cl25
75D100448C20?OpenDocument.
77-78, 80 (discussing the human rights issue of
126. See Forst, supra note 114,
respecting citizens' rights and the U.S. stated plan of "expel[ling] tens of thousands of migrants
unlawfully residing in its territory").
127. Id. 78.
128. Id IT 77-78.
129. Id. T 15.
130. Human Rights Council 11th Sess. (Item 10 of the Agenda) Technical Assistance and
Capacity-Building Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti,
Michel Forst (Mar. 26, 2009), at http://www2.ohchr.og/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/
11 session/A.HRC. 11.5.pdf.
While the situation relating to prolonged pretrial detention in Haiti has been
the subject of much literature and many recommendations, the independent
expert nevertheless notes with regret the delays in the implementation of
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pretrial detention constitute eighty percent of the prison population.'31
Haitian prisons lack hygiene and healthcare, and are generally
dangerous.132 Many prisons lack medicine and food.133 Moreover, many
Haitian prisons have been destroyed as a result of political and
environmental crises, leading to an increase in prisoners detained at
police stations ill-equipped for this task. 134
Young offenders are especially vulnerable. 3 5 In some cases,
juveniles have been remanded in custody for up to two years due to the
lack of children's magistrates in certain districts.' 36 Juveniles are also
required to share accommodations with adult prisoners.137 According to
Forst, Haiti needs to establish alternative measures for juveniles, such as
rehabilitation and reintegration programs.' 38
Combating corruption and police reform are necessary. Although
implementation has been slow, President Pr6val appeared to make a
political commitment to making the fight against corruption a strategic
objective. 139 Haiti was ranked 155 out of 159 countries surveyed in
Transparency International's 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index. o The
relationship between the Haitian people and the National Police "is still
most of the recommendations. It should be pointed out that, according to the
figures supplied by MINUSTAH, in November 2008 the rate of pretrial
detention was still 80 per cent, being higher in the jurisdiction of the West
Department (86 per cent) than in the other jurisdictions of the country (70
per cent on average). The average length of pretrial detention is about two
years for felonies and between 12 and 18 months for misdemeanours. Over
4 per cent of detainees awaiting trial for petty offences, their confinement
being unlawful or arbitrary, 80 per cent of remand prisoners' cases are held
up at the prosecution or investigation stage and only 7 per cent of cases are
currently being tried.
Id. Also on April 24, 2007 USAID did an audit of Haiti's Justice Program and found major
delays in pretrial but does not specify the number of years. USAID, Audit of USAID/Haiti's
Justice Program, Audit Report #1-521-07-008-P, Apr. 24, 2007, at http://www.usaid.gov/ht/
docs/eqdocs/budget-documents/office of theinspectorgeneral reports/1-521-07-008-p.pdf.
131. Id. 64.
132. Id. 61.
133. Id.
134. Id. 60.
135. Id. 49.
136. See id (stating, "juveniles were remanded in custody but not brought before a judge
owing to the lack of a children's magistrate in the jurisdiction concerned").
137. Id.
138. Id. 51.
139. Id. 26 (stating, "[s]uccessive speeches by President Prdval since 2007 appear to have
sent out a clear and renewed signal of the political commitment to making the fight against
corruption a strategic objective but implementation seems to be slow").
140. Transparency Int'l, Ann. Rep. (2005), at 16-17, available at http://www.
transparency.org/publications/publications/annual reports/annual report 2005 (follow appropriate hyperlink for desired language).
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characterized by suspicion, accusations of brutality, human rights
violations[,] and complicity with criminal and corrupt elements,"
including "allegations of brutality, violence[,] and rape by uniformed
officers., 4 1 In addition, "the judicial branch never received a systematic
overhaul," creating mob justice and further alienating the general
population. 4 2
The Haitian government has also been associated with deep failures
in public security services. Since these problems derive in "large part
from a traditionally weak Haitian state incapable of effectively
addressing the country's needs, understanding Haiti today requires an
analysis of the persisting systemic weaknesses of the state." 4 3
Finally, trafficking in narcotics has been a serious problem in Haiti
since the 1980s, with the government either unwilling or unable to
prevent the smuggling of drugs.'" Moreover, the "prevailing political
turmoil . . . poverty rate [and poor economic conditions], ha[ve]

generated a rise in crime and violence, which the police and judiciary
have been unable to tackle effectively." 4 5 Despite over $2 billion spent
on international efforts to develop an independent police force in Haiti,
this goal has yet to be achieved.

IV. CAPACITY GAPS
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and
contends with multi-faceted challenges stemming from weak public
institutions. Of Haiti's nine million people, 75% live on less than $2 per
day.147 In the book State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of
Terror, Marlye G61in-Adams and David Malone suggest that Haiti has
always been on the edge of failure. 14 8 This considerable disparity in
incomes leaves the majority of the population with very limited
means.
141.

Forst, supra note 114, 135.

STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 299. Additionally, "the justice
system remains inaccessible to large segments of the population, particularly in the rural areas.
It lacks resources, competent judges, and the necessary credibility to serve the citizenry ....
Meanwhile, overcrowded prisons hold alleged offenders for years without trial and under
appalling conditions." Id.
142.

143. STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 287.
144. WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 6, at 19.
145. STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 298.

146. Id. at 297.
147. Dupuy, supra note 5.
148. See STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 4, at 287.
149.

REPUBLIC OF HAITI, PREPARATORY

COMM., GROWTH AND

POVERTY REDUCTION

STRATEGY PAPER, MAKING A QUALITATIVE LEAP FORWARD 8 (2007), available at http://

siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHAITIINFRENCH/Resources/HaitiDSNCRPEnglish.pdf
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Another factor adversely affecting the average Haitian's quality of
life is population density. In the last 20 years, Haiti's population has
grown at a rate of between 1.9% and 2.4%."s0 This is a major problem
for such a tiny island. As of 2008, there was an estimated 354.9 people
for every square kilometre in Haiti, compared to 203.3 people per
square kilometre in the Dominican Republic.15 '
Life expectancy remains relatively low, and only 60% of the adult
population is literate.1 52 The vast majority of schools are private, and
only 20% of schools in Haiti are controlled by the State.1 53 The
functioning of the system is largely ensured through private
Over one hundred NGOs are involved in the education
financing.
sector.15
The International Food Policy Research Institute compiled a Global
Hun er Index, which ranked Haiti 78th out of the 84 countries on the
list. In 2006, only half of the rural population had access to improved
drinking water sources. 5 7 The 2010 earthquake has only heightened the
food insecurity facing certain segments of the population.
In addition, "[i]t is estimated that one of every twelve Haitians has
contracted HIV/AIDS."158 One forecast predicts that the number of
orphaned children in Haiti will be 350,000 with the next 10 years.1 59

150. U.N. Dev. Programme, Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development,
2009 HuM. DEV. REP. 193, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN
Complete.pdf [hereinafter UNDP].
151. WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 2011, at 107, 133 (2d ed.
2011), available at http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821382189 [hereinafter
MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK].
152. See UNDP, supra note 150, at 183 (Haiti's male life expectancy in 2007 was 62.9
years and female life expectancy in 2007 was 59.1 years; Haiti's male adult literacy rate was
64% and its female adult literacy rate was 60.1%).
153. Jeffrey Puryear & Michael Lisman, Haiti's Educational Moment, 9 FOCALPOINT:
CANADA'S SPOTLIGHT ON THE AMERICAS 8 (2010), http://www.focal.ca/pdflfocalpoint-march
2010.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
154. Id.
155.

REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supra note 149, at 40.

156. The Challenge of Hunger: Focus on the Crisis of Child Undernutrition,2010 INT'L
FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST. 17.

157. See REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supra note 149, at 24; UNDP, supra note 150, at 178.

158. Paper on The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti prepared by Carlo Dade & John
W. Graham, Senior Advisor with and Chair of FOCAL (Canadian Found. for the Americas), for
the House of Commons Comm. on Foreign Aff. and Int'l Trade, in response to the Committee's
Request 2 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.focal.ca/pdflHaiti_post-AristideGraham%
20April%202004_e.pdf [hereinafter The Rolefor Canada in Post-AristideHaiti].
159. Id.
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V. THE HAITIAN ECONOMY
Haiti has the least developed economy in the Western Hemisphere,
with a GDP of about $11.9 billion in 2009.160 The Haitian banking
system is weak, with limited access to credit, and the agriculture and
transport sectors, the lifeblood of the domestic economy, "remain
woefully inadequate."1 6 1 Poverty, corruption, limited infrastructure, and
insecurity are among the serious barriers to economic development,
growth and prosperity in Haiti.162 Few Haitians have steady incomes.
Even before the earthquake, the percentage of Haitians with steady
incomes was estimated at between 60% and 80%.163 Most Haitians
scrape by "doing odd jobs or relying on remittances from abroad that
make up a quarter of Haiti's $7 billion gross domestic product."1 64
Although Haiti has become reliant on food imports, nearl' twothirds of the Haitian labor force works in the agricultural sector. 65 The
manufacturing sector is small, accounting for 7.6% of GDP.16 6 In his
2009 report for the United Nations, Former World Bank economist and
Oxford Professor Paul Collier argued that Haiti has several advantages
that can enable it to become globally competitive in the garment
assembly industry, given the advantages extended to that country under
HOPE II and its proximity to the U.S. market. 167
There are a multitude of challenges facing Haiti's infrastructure.
Only 24% of the country's roads are covered with asphalt and
transportation networks are vulnerable to storms and mudslides.16 As a
result, businesses struggle to operate within Haiti's difficult economy.
The World Bank's 2010 Ease of Doing Business index placed Haiti
162nd out of 183 countries.169 Haiti's capacity to provide political
goods has steadily been compromised by autocratic and corrupt
leadership, weak institutions, an intimidated civil society, high levels of
160. CIA,

THE WORLD FACTBOOK, HAITI, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html [hereinafter CIA].
161. See REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supra note 149, at 54 (stating the agriculture sector receives
less than 1%of the available credit).
162. See generally id.
163. Jonathan M. Katz, Can Low-Paying Garment Industry Save Haiti?, ABCNEWS, Feb.
21, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStoryid=9902789.
164. Id.
165. CIA, supra note 160; see also EconomyWatch, Haiti Industry Sectors, http://www.
economywatch.com/worldeconomy/haitilindustry-sector-industries.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2011).
166. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. REs. SERV., THE HAITIAN ECONOMY AND THE HOPE ACT,

RL34687, at 8 (2010).
167. Katz, supra note 163.
168. CIA, supra note 160.
169. World Bank, Ranking of Economics-Doing Business, http://doingbusiness.org/
rankings (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

17

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

66

[Vol. 23

crime, low GDP levels per capita-a per capita GNI of $510 in 2000high rates of infant mortality, suspicion from or outright hostility by its
neighbors, and many other deficiencies. 170
There is a large Haitian Diaspora, which has caused a significant
"brain drain," but which also provides some much needed foreiF
remittances.171 Such remittances amounted to $1.8 billion in 2008.
Haitians rely on remittances more than any other country in the Western
Hemisphere. 7 3
Multiple challenges face the Haitian banking system's role in
supporting the domestic economy: weak legal and institutional
frameworks, lax security, poor governance, poverty, low savings rates,
and the limited number of individuals involved in the formal economy.
There is also limited access to credit: the agriculture and transport
sectors, the lifeblood of the domestic economy, receive less than 3.2%
of the available credit.' 74
"The lack of electricity contributes to further increases in nontechnical losses and it affects the economic growth." 7 5 Of Haiti, 75%
lacked access to electricity, and the few that have it are unable to pay
for it.176
Prerequisites to reform include modernization of the country's
agricultural sector and transportation infrastructure, improvement of the
electricity supply, and enhancement of telecommunications services,
tourism, and other sectors. 77 Improvements in education and healthcare
are also required.' 7 8 Greater respect for the rule of law, a restructured
and modernized justice system, and effort to create a professional and
effective national police force should not be delayed due to the
humanitarian crisis created by the earthquake.1 79
Long-term strategies are already being proposed by world leaders,
including French President Nicholas Sarkozy, which would highlight
170. WHEN STATES FAIL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 6, at 19.

171. Barbara MacLaren, Engaging the Haitian Diasporain Development, FOCAL, Mar. 29,
http://www.focal.ca/pdf/diasporaMacLarenengaging%20Haitian%20diaspora%20in
2010,
%20developmentMarch%2029%202010.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
172.

Yves Savain, Building Big in Haiti, 9 FOCALPOINT: CANADA'S SPOTLIGHT ON THE

AMERICAS 14 (2010), http://www.focal.ca/pdfl.focalpointmarch20l0.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,
2011).
173.

See MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK, supra note 151, at 14.

174. Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Haiti: Selected Issues, 71, IMF Staff Country Report
05/205 (June 2005), availableat http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2005/crO5205.pdf.
175.

Dan Schnitzer, Avoid the Old Poverty Traps, FOREIGN POL'Y MAG., Jan. 19, 2010,

availableat http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/19/howto
176. Id.
177.

helphaitirebuild?.

See REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supra note 149, at 9.

178. Id.
179. Id at 12.
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improvement in agricultural production and tourism, as well as
decentralization of power away from Port-au-Prince. 80 In addition, in
February 2010, the G7 Finance Ministers announced that all bilateral
debt extended to Haiti by the G7 nations had been forgiven, and they
asked that the remaining $1 billion in debt owed to the Inter-American
Development Bank, Venezuela, the World Bank, and the IMF be
cancelled.18
Notwithstanding these commitments, past policies advocated by
major powers, such as the United States, France, the World Bank, and
the IMF, have proven disastrous for the Haitian economy.182 Moreover,
according to a World Bank report, 15 years of development assistance
have produced "no noticeable effect."' 8 "Equally detrimental to Haiti's
economy ha[ve] been the unsuitable policies that the international
financial institutions have advocated for the country" in the past.' 84
Unable to compete with cheaper and subsidized food imports, the
country has become dependent on them. 8 5
VI. REBUILDING HAITI'S DEVASTATED NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Past governments have neglected Haiti's natural environment and
mismanaged its resources, rendering it vulnerable to natural disasters.
The country
is one of the world's most natural disaster-prone . . . due to its

location in the high latitude tropics, [with] mountainous terrain
rising to almost 2,700 metres above sea level .

. .

. Steep slopes

alternate with a few arable plains and valleys bordered by rivers.
This topography forces the population to farm the hillsides and
reside in plains beneath now deforested watersheds.' 86
Haiti's widespread poverty is a cause and a symptom of the general
deterioration of its natural environment. For example, "75 percent of the
180. In Historic First, Sarkozy Visits Haiti, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 17, 2010,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35438470/ns/world-news-haiti-earthquake/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2011).
181. G7 Nations Pledge Debt Relief for Quake-Hit Haiti, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8502567.stm (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
182. Dupuy, supra note 5.
183. The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti,supra note 158.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Haiti: Saving the Environment, Preventing Instability and Conflict, Policy Briefing,
2009 INT'L CRisis GROUP 1, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/latinamerica/haiti/haiti savingthe environment_preventinginstability and conflict.ashx.
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country's energy demands are met with firewood and charcoal." 87 The
United Nations estimated that in 2005, only 3.8% of Haiti's territory
was still covered by forest.'8 8 The management of Haiti's natural
environment must be a key element in any long-term development
strategy for the country.' 8 The vulnerability of Haiti to cyclical
disasters has only pushed many Haitians further into poverty.
Before the earthquake hit, Haiti had been devastated by a series of
hurricanes in 2008, and a food shortage in 2009.190 The response to such
disasters from the international community has historically been
ineffectual and uneven,191 but support for Haiti's long-term
development requires concerted, coordinated, and consistent action.' 92
These actions need to be coupled with institutional change on the part of
Haiti's government; otherwise, effective change will not occur.' 93
The collapse of important government buildings, as well as power
plants, hospitals, and schools, have only exacerbated already immense
development issues. Any recovery plan needs to focus first on restoring
the basic services needed for survival. Jeffrey Sachs, director of the
Earth Institute at Columbia University and the author of End of Poverty,
argues that the recovery operation requires "a single, transparent, multidonor recovery fund," such as the Inter-American Development Bank,
to finance its survival and reconstruction.194 IMF Chief, Dominique
Strauss-Kahn, has repeatedly stated that something akin to the Marshall
Plan is needed for Haiti, but with full ownership of the Haitian
people. 9 5
Following the 2010 earthquake, donor countries came together again
with the Haitian government in Montreal, Canada to build a strategy for

187. Jeneen Interlandi, The Looming Threat, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 2010, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/24/the-looming-threat.html.
188. UNstats, Millenium Indicators, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx (follow
hyperlink for Goal 7 and then Goal 7A) (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
189. Interlandi, supra note 187.
190. See Erickson, supra note 1 (discussing the 2008 food riots); see also Paul Collier &
Jean-Louis Warnholz, How to Help Rebuild Haiti: Endow a Multibillion-DollarHaiti Fund,
FOREIGN POL'Y MAG., Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/
01/19/howtohelphaiti rebuild? (stating that "four hurricanes wreaked devastation," in 2008).
191. Dupuy, supra note 5.
192. See Erikson, supra note 1 (stating, "co-ordination will be key to reconstruction efforts
in Haiti").
193. See Margolis, supra note 9 (stating, "[flood and medical help are essential, but Haiti
also must have an effective government that cares for its desperate people. Otherwise, Haiti will
again fall into the abyss the next time a major natural disaster occurs.").
194. Sachs, supra note 88.
195. Interview with Christiane Amanpour with Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing
Director of the Int'l Monetary Fund, in Haiti (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://archives.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/1001/22/ampr.01.html.
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the country's future, outlining a 10-year rebuilding effort.' 9 6 The
conference focused more on planning and needs-assessment, rather than
on the commitment of funds.' 97 However, it has been estimated that
Haiti's reconstruction could cost as much as $14 billion.'9 8
A central issue is whether donor countries will be working with
Haiti's government to build its capacity to administer programs. In the
past, faced with institutional weakness and corruption, the preferred
approach has often been to circumvent government agencies in favor of
NGOs, the private sector, and donor-directed projects.199 There are an
estimated 10,000 NGOs operating in Haiti.2 00 In his 2009 report for the
U.N. Secretary General on Haiti's economic future, Paul Collier went so
far as to propose the creation of an "Independent Service Authority" as
a pilot project, through which money would come in from the
government and international donors, be channelled to NGOs and the
private sector on a contractual basis, and then be evaluated for
performance. 201
Since the earthquake, Paul Collier has been promoting an economic
development plan for Haiti that is centered on the garment industry. 2 02
Collier likens it to the opening of the American West: "[t]he earthquake
could usher in such a boom in Haiti."2 0 3 Former President Bill Clinton,
a U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti, shares the vision in which garments play
a central role in Haiti's economy, arguing that "[t]he rich will get richer,
but there will be a much, much bigger middle class, with poor people
pouring into it at a rapid rate." 204 Their argument is predicated on the
assumption that the garment industry could quickly produce hundreds of
thousands of jobs, due to an existing preferential trade deal with the

196. Alexandre Deslongchamps & Peter S. Green, Haiti Seeks Reconstruction Aid at
Montreal Meeting (Update 1), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-25/haiti-premier-seeks-rebuild-help-at-montrealmeeting-updatel-.html.
197. Id.
198. Merle David Kellerhals, Jr., Rebuilding Haiti May Cost $14 Billion, Study Shows,
AMERICA.Gov., Feb. 18., 2010, http://www.america.gov/st/develop-english/2010/February/
2010021811337dmslahrellek0.898266.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
199. Paul Collier, How to Fix Haiti's Fixers, FOREIGN POL'Y MAG., Feb. 18, 2010,
availableat http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/18/how-to-fix-haitis-fixers.
200. Michele Wucker, Let Haitians Take the Lead, FOREIGN POL'Y MAG., Jan. 19, 2010,
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/19/how-to helphaitirebuild?
page=O, 1.
201. Report from Paul Collier, Professor, Oxford U., to Ban Ki-moon, Sec'y Gen. of the
U.N., Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security (2009), available at
http://www.focal.ca/pdf/haiticollier.pdf.
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United States, and cheap Haitian labor.2 05 The deal in question is the
Haiti Hemispheric Opportunity Through Partnership Encouragement
Act, or "HOPE II," which was passed by the U.S. Congress in 2008 and
allows Haiti to export textiles duty-free to the United States for a
decade. 206 Collier and Clinton believe that alternatives to
manufacturing-agriculture exports or natural resource exports-are
much less likely to lift a country from poverty over the long term. 207
However, Clinton and Collier fail to consider that "in 1984 ... 125,000
Haitians were employed in light manufacturing. But within 10 years
those jobs were gone, the result of. .. corrupt, incapable governments
and resulting trade embargoes." 2 08
It is unclear whether cheap labor is the solution to Haiti's chronic
unemployment and poverty. This plan will only "take the jobs away
from Dominican, Mexican, and Central American workers-and pay the
Haitians even less for doing the same work." 209 Prime Minister JeanMax Bellerive, has stated that the garment industry should not be
ignored, but has also sought increased investment in more enduring
sectors such as agriculture and tourism.210
"The recovery effort after the 2008 disasters

. . .

was stalled by

political deadlock, allegations of electoral fraud and corruption,
infighting among wealthy elites, limited resources, and a lack of
coordinated results-based management by Haiti's aid partners." 21 1 In
past efforts to develop Haiti "there was never enough money available
to meet Haiti's needs. Much of the money that Haiti did receive went to
repaying debt and shoring up the currency, and too little was left over to
invest in education, health care, and other essential infrastructure." 2 12
"To avoid past mistakes, [Michele Wucker argues that] plans for
recovery must actively involve Haitians and use the rebuilding as a
chance to engage Haitian civil society." 213 There must also be "more
coordination among the over 10,000 NGOs working in Haiti." 2 14 "The
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See generally Jennifer Wells, Haiti's Garment Industry Hanging by a Thread,
THESTAR.COM, Oct. 15, 2010, http://www.thestar.com/haiti/economic/article/875952-haiti-sgarment-industry-hanging-by-a-thread.
208. Adrienne Arsenault, The Experts Wade In, All Suggestions Welcome, CBC NEWS, Jan.
20, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/01/20/f-rfa-arsenault.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2011).
209. David L. Wilson, "Rebuilding Haiti -the Sweatshop Hoax, MRZINE, Apr. 3, 2010,
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/wilsonO40310.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
210. Katz, supra note 163.
211. Collier & Warnholz, supra note 190.
212. Wucker, supra note 200.
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Haitian government needs financial support and technical assistance to
build its own capacity to partner with private groups."2 15 Clare
Lockhart, co-founder and CEO of the Institute for State Effectiveness
and co-author of Fixing FailedStates: A Frameworkfor Rebuilding a
Fractured World, argues for training Haitians, but with full
transparency in terms of funding.2 16
Rebuilding Haiti clearly presents enormous challenges with respect
to accountability and sustainability, particularly in the absence of local
ownership or through imposed solutions of state-building.
On March 31, 2010, over 150 U.N. member states and international
organizations gathered in New York and pledged $5.3 billion over the
next eighteen months for the Haiti recovery plan. 2 17 "As we move from
emergency aid to long-term reconstruction," stated Secretary General
Ban Ki-Moon, "what we envision is a wholesale national renewal, a
sweeping exercise in nation-building on a scale and scope not seen in
generations. "21 The amount pledged over the next three years totalled
$9.9 billion from 59 countries and international organizations.219
There is, however, growing frustration with the provision of
international aid to Haiti both in terms of fulfillment of donor country
commitments and realization of earlier stated objectives. 220 In January
2011, the Right Honorable Michaelle Jean, Canada's former Governor
General and now the U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti, expressed
exasperation with the lack of results, including the fact that one million
Haitians remain in tent cities, deaths from cholera continue, and as a
result this has left Haitians feeling "abandoned and disheartened." 22 1
She has been critical of the international community and the manner in
which it has honored its post-earthquake fiscal and development
commitments to Haiti.22 2
Past patterns need to be broken to ensure state accountability, and to
create institutions capable of meeting the most basic needs. Factors
which have contributed to an ineffective government in Haiti include a
"tradition of repression; the lack of consensus and an absence of vision
among Haiti's leaders; and the lack of legitimacy of state officials in the
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eyes of the Haitian population." 223
In the past, donor coordination has been problematic. Foreign
assistance was fragmented, "poorly planned, mutually undermining ...
and of insufficient duration." 224 Moreover, foreign governments have
assumed that "domestic economic growth would inherently and
automatically yield social and political stability without taking into
account the negative impact of regional and even global economic
Clearly, donor coordination
policies on the local economy."2
of
Haiti. In fact, the U.N. Office
continues to plague the reconstruction
for the Special Envoy for Haiti in its year-end (2010) report indicated
that "[d]onors have disbursed 63.6% of that $2.01 billion," referring to
only the amount promised for 2010, not the entire multi-year relief
effort commitment package.226 The perennial problems associated with
the delivery of aid to Haiti continue unabated, consistent with the
historic challenges that have repeatedly manifested themselves.

VII. CONCLUSION
Past efforts by the international community to improve the quality of
life and governance in Haiti have generally failed, and a new paradigm
is needed. Hopefully, international organizations such as the United
Nations, OAS, and CARICOM will learn from past mistakes and be
prepared to implement a long-term leadership plan that actively
involves the Haitian people.
International actors attempting to "fix" Haiti have essentially caused
the state to fail in the first place. Although there are no simple solutions,
by addressing the gaps of state failure and having a better understanding
of the causes, it will at least be possible to work toward a framework for
policymakers to better predict, prevent, and develop a global mode of
statehood. There is an increasingly urgent need to build effective,
capable, stable, and sustainable states in order to bring order and reduce
poverty.
The growing disregard for Haitian political leaders has created a
crisis of credibility within Haiti. A strong and sustained commitment to
build democratic institutions, to promote the rule of law through a more
merit-based appointment process, and to encourage orderly and
systematic contributions from civil society, are all urgently required,
223.
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226. Office of the U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti, Int'l Assistance to Haiti: Key Facts as of
Dec. 2010, at 1, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/haitieproduction/assets/22/l._Overall_
financing keyfacts_FINAL 6_original.pdf.
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and constitute key steps in the process of state-building.
Indeed, the situation in Haiti with respect to political stability and
democratic reform has once again descended into a chaotic miasma that
has pitted Haitian political figures against principal donor nations and
international organizations. The obstinacy with which Haitian leaders
have refused recommendations from the OAS to resolve the chaos that
followed the November 28, 2010 election has led to potentially
disastrous consequences for the people of Haiti. It has been reported
that "the U.S. government warned that Haiti's government risks losing
aid for earthquake reconstruction if it does not accept the OAS
recommendations." 227
The current reality is that Haiti is completely dependent upon
external support structures, which provide financial contributions,
foreign personnel, and an imposed security apparatus. Therefore, there
must be sustained efforts to construct domestic governance institutions
to avoid what could easily come to be a de facto trusteeship.
At present, there is perhaps an unprecedented level of resolve within
the international community to assist Haiti, although as we have seen in
early 2011, chronic and seemingly insoluble problems familiar to Haiti
are appearing to undermine these commitments. The challenge,
therefore, is to sustain and capitalize on this earlier resolve by creating
stable domestic institutions, establishing workable infrastructure that
will support economic recovery and self-sufficiency, and solve the
country's serious security problems.
The disastrous November 2010 elections, the conflict that has
resulted in their wake, the ongoing failure to make substantive progress
in restoring infrastructure, ongoing epidemics, chronic political
instability, now further heightened by the return of Baby Doc, and the
lack of progress despite the level of external financial assistance once
again threatens to undermine and defeat yet another unique opportunity
that emerged for Haiti following the tragic January 2010 earthquake.
These developments in early 2011 are familiar to Haiti. One can only
hope that with continuing outside assistance and direction this time the
familiar pattern will not result in a familiar outcome.
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